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SIDESTEPPING CONGRESS:
PRESIDENTS ACTING UNDER THE
UN AND NATOt
Louis Fisher'
The most striking transformation of the war power over the
past fifty years is the extent to which Presidents seek authority not
from Congress but from international and regional institutions,
particularly the United Nations and the North Atlantic Council.
Although this pattern violates the U.S. Constitution and the legisla-
tive intent of the UN and NATO, and represents an effort through
the treaty process to strip from the House of Representatives its
constitutional role in matters of war, the trend is unmistakable and
continues its course with little interruption from Congress or the
courts.
Truman in Korea, Bush in Iraq, Clinton in Haiti and
Bosnia-in each instance a President circumvented Congress by
relying either on the UN or NATO. President Bush also stitched
together a multilateral alliance before turning to Congress at the
eleventh hour to obtain statutory authority. Each exercise of power
built a stronger base for unilateral presidential action, no matter
how illegal, unconstitutional, and undemocratic. The attitude,
increasingly, is not to do things the right way in accordance with
the Constitution and our laws but to do the "right thing." It is an
attitude of autocracy, if not monarchy. How long do we drift in
these currents before discovering that the waters are hazardous for
constitutional government?
t This paper is based on Presidential War Power, by Louis Fisher, © 1995 by the
University Press of Kansas. Material used by permission of the publisher.
ft Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
When the Framers assembled in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft
the Constitution, existing models of government in Europe placed
the war power and foreign affairs solely in the hands of the king.
John Locke and William Blackstone, whose models of government
exerted a powerful influence on the Framers, assigned war powers
and foreign policy exclusively to the executive branch. Matters of
treaties, ambassadors, raising and regulating fleets and armies, and
other actions over war and peace were vested in the king.'
Throughout the debates at Philadelphia and in the state ratify-
ing conventions, delegates expressly rejected the monarchical power
over external relations. At the Philadelphia convention, Charles
Pinckney said he was for "a vigorous Executive but was afraid the
Executive powers of <the existing> Congress might extend to
peace & war &c which would render the Executive a Monarchy, of
the worst kind, to wit an elective one."2 John Rutledge wanted the
executive power placed in a single person, "tho' he was not for
giving him the power of war and peace."3 James Wilson endorsed
a single executive but "did not consider the Prerogatives of the
British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive pow-
ers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislature nature.
Among others that of war & peace &c."4 Edmund Randolph wor-
ried about executive power, calling it "the foetus of monarchy."5
A lengthy speech by Alexander Hamilton articulated his prin-
ciples of government. Although later associated with vigorous and
independent presidential power, he too jettisoned the British model
of executive prerogatives in foreign affairs and the war power.
After admitting that in his "private opinion he had no scruple in
declaring... that the British Govt. was the best in the world,' '6
he nonetheless discarded the Blackstonian and Lockean models. He
proposed that the President would have "with the advice and ap-
probation of the Senate" the power of making treaties, the Senate
would have the "sole power of declaring war," and the President
would be authorized to have "the direction of war when authorized
1. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 1-2 (1995).
2. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 64-65 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937).
3. Id. at 65.
4. Id. at 65-66.
5. Id. at 66.
6. Id. at 288.
1238 [Vol. 47:1237
SIDESTEPPING CONGRESS
or begun."7 He repeated those principles in his private writings, as
in Federalist No. 69 and Federalist No. 75.
At the Philadelphia convention, the delegates recognized the
need for the President, to take certain emergency actions of a de-
fensive nature. The early draft empowered Congress to "make
war." Charles Pinckney objected that legislative proceedings "were
too slow" for the safety of the country in an emergency, since he
expected Congress to meet but once a year. Madison and Elbridge
Gerry moved to insert "declare" for "make," leaving to the Presi-
dent "the power to repel sudden attacks."8
Reactions to the Madison-Gerry amendment underscore the
limited grant of authority to the President. Pierce Butler wanted to
give the President the power to make war, arguing that he "will
have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when
the Nation will support it." Roger Sherman objected: "The Execu-
tive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war."9 Gerry said
he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the
Executive alone to declare war."'" George Mason spoke "agst giv-
ing the power of war to the Executive, because not [safely] to be
trusted with it; ... He was for clogging rather than facilitating
war."I
Similar statements were heard at the state ratifying conven-
tions. In Pennsylvania, James Wilson expressed the prevailing
sentiment:
[That the system of checks and balances] will not hurry us
into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be
in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to
involve us in such distress; for the important power of
declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.'2
In North Carolina, James Iredell contrasted the limited powers of
the President with those of the British monarch. The king of Great
Britain was not only the Commander in Chief "but has power, in
time of war, to raise fleets and armies. He has also authority to
7. Farrand, supra note 2, at 292.
8. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 318-19 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937).
9. Id. at 318.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 319.
12. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSITIMON 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836-45).
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declare war." The President, however, "has not the power of de-
claring war by his own authority, nor that of raising fleets and
armies. These powers are vested in other hands."' 3 In South Caro-
lina, Charles Pinckney assured his colleagues that the President's
powers "did not permit him to declare war."' 4
The duty to repel sudden attacks represented a narrow grant of
power. It permitted the President to protect the mainland of the
United States and troops stationed abroad, but the authority to take
actions beyond defensive operations was reserved to Congress. John
Bassett Moore, a noted scholar of international law, described the
limited power available to the President:
There can hardly be room for doubt that the framers of the
constitution, when they vested in Congress the power to
declare war, never imagined that they were leaving it to the
executive to use the military and naval forces of the United
States all over the world for the purpose of actually coerc-
ing other nations, occupying their territory, and killing their
soldiers and citizens, all according to his own notions of
the fitness of things, as long as he refrained from calling
his action war or persisted in calling it peace.
The constitutional framework adopted by the Framers for the
war power is remarkably clear in its basic principles. The authority
to initiate war lay with Congress. The President could act unilater-
ally only in one area: to repel sudden attacks. Anyone who scans
the war-power provisions of the Constitution is likely to agree with
Taylor Reveley that "the text tilts decisively toward Congress."' 6
Over the past two centuries, a number of incidents were invoked
by Presidents and their supporters to expand the President's poten-
tial for making war over the formal power of Congress to declare
war. Various "life and property" actions and the stretching of the
concept of "defensive war" were taken to justify unilateral execu-
tive authority. These actions, for the most part, were of modest
scope.'7 The major military actions were declared by Congress
13. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 107 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836-45).
14. Id. at 287.
15. 5 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETT MOORE 196 (1944).
16. W. TAYLOR REVELEY I, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO
HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OIVE BRANCH? 29 (1981).
17. See FISHER, supra note 1, at 13-69.
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(the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War,
World War I, and World War II) or authorized by Congress (the
Quasi-War against France, the Barbary Wars, and the Vietnam
War).18
Of much greater concern are the military operations conducted
by Presidents after World War II, particularly when justified under
the supposed authority of the UN Charter and mutual security
treaties. Nothing in the history of the UN or NATO implies that
Congress gave the President unilateral power to wage war. The
legislative histories of those treaties show no such intent. Yet Pres-
idents now almost routinely invoke those instruments to initiate
military operations.
I1. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The UN Charter was drafted against the backdrop of the disas-
ter of the Versailles Treaty and President Woodrow Wilson's deter-
mination to make foreign policy without Congress. When he sub-
mitted the treaty to the Senate on July 10, 1919, he attached to it
the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant provided for
an assembly (giving each member nation an equal voice) and a
council (consisting of representatives from the United States, Great
Britain, France, Italy, Japan and four othei nations elected by the
assembly). Members pledged to submit to the League all disputes
threatening war and to use military and economic sanctions against
nations that threatened war.
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass.) offered a number of
"reservations" to protect American interests. The second of fourteen
reservations concerned the congressional prerogative to decide
questions of war.
The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the
territorial integrity or political independence of any other
country or to interfere in controversies between
nations-whether members of the league or not-under the
provisions of article 10, or to employ the military or naval
forces of the United States under any article of the treaty
for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress,
which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to de-
clare war or authorize the employment of the military or
18. See id. at 17-18, 24-34, 41-44, 54-57, 63-69, 115-18.
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naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint
resolution so provide. 9
Wilson opposed the Lodge reservations, claiming that they "cut
out the heart of this Covenant" and represented "nullification" of
the treaty." His earlier writings had advocated that international
negotiations should be handled exclusively by the President, with-
out any legislative involvement. The President would then throw
the treaty on the Senate, which would have no other alternative but
to grant its approval to avoid embarrassment to the nation. Accord-
ing to Wilson, the President "need disclose no step of negotiation
until it is complete, and when in any critical matter it is completed
the government is virtually committed. Whatever its disinclination,
the Senate may feel itself committed also."'
Wilson's strategy in presenting the Treaty of Versailles to the
Senate as a fait accompli marked an abysmal failure. The Senate
rejected the treaty in November 1919 and again in March 1920.
Decades later, in the midst of World War II, allied nations took
steps to create a world organization. Wilson's dismal experience
remained part of the collective memory. In the meetings that led to
the United Nations, the predominant view was that any commit-
ment of U.S. forces to a world body would require prior authoriza-
tion by both Houses of Congress. That attitude is reflected in the
debates over the UN Charter, the UN Participation Act of 1945,
and the 1949 amendments to the UN Participation Act.
The creation of the United Nations progressed through several
steps, including the Ball Resolution, the Connally and Fulbright
Resolutions, and meetings at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and in San
Francisco in 1945. On March 16, 1943, Senator Joseph Hurst Ball
(R-Minn.) introduced a resolution calling for the formation of the
United Nations. Joined by Senators Lister Hill (D-Ala.), Harold
Burton (R-Ohio), and Carl Hatch (D-N.M.), the bipartisan nature of
the resolution commanded respectful attention. However, the brief
Senate debate on the Ball Resolution said nothing about which
branch of government would commit U.S. troops.'
19. 58 CONG. REc. 8777 (1919).
20. 63 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 451 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1990); 64 THE
PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 47, 51 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1991).
21. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTTONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 77-78
(1908). For a similar philosophy, see WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT
233-34 (1885).
22. 89 CONG. REC. 2030-31 (1943).
1242 [Vol. 47:1237
SIDESTEPPING CONGRESS
On the day that Senator Ball introduced his resolution, Walter
Lippmann wrote an article on the Senate's role in giving advice
and consent to treaties. Lippmann had long been identified as a
defender of foreign policy formulated by elites and executive offi-
cials. However, he now urged that President Wilson's mistake with
the Treaty of Versailles not be repeated. Ways and means had to
be found of "enabling the Senate to participate in the
negotiations."'  By associating the Senate "continually with the
President before and during the momentous negotiations that have
to be undertaken," the two branches would be "restoring the Senate
to the place intended for it by the authors of the Constitution."'24
A resolution introduced by Congressman J. William Fulbright
(D-Ark.) also supported the concept of a United Nations. Congress-
man Hamilton Fish (R-N.Y.) proposed that the resolution end with
the language "favoring participation by the United States therein
through its constitutional processes." Fish explained that the ad-
ditional language meant that any commitment to join the United
Nations, made either by agreement or by treaty, "must go through
in a constitutional way, either by a two-thirds vote of the Senate or
by the approval of the entire Congress."' He warned that a num-
ber of members of Congress were prepared to oppose the Fulbright
Resolution because they "are afraid that some secret commitments
will be entered into and that the Congress will be by-passed, and
that the Constitution will be ignored."'27
The House passed the Fulbright Resolution, as introduced, 252
to 23" The following day it voted again, after adding the lan-
guage "through its constitutional processes," and this time the
margin was 360 to 29.29 The House action sharply challenged the
Senate's presumed monopoly to define foreign policy for the legis-
lative branch. The debate pointed out that both Houses had acted
on the declaration of war for World War II, voted funds to sustain
it, and conscripted American soldiers to fight the battles.30 Recall-
ing the Senate's role in rejecting the Treaty of Versailles, Con-
23. Walter Lippmann, Advice and Consent of the Senate, WAsH. POST, Mar. 16, 1943,
at 26, reprinted at 89 CONG. REC. 2032 (1943).
24. Id.
25. 89 CONG. REc. 7646-47 (1943) (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 7647.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 7655.
29. See id. at 7728-29.
30. See 89 CONG. REC. at 7705 (statement of Congressman Richards).
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gressman Mike Monroney (D-Okla.) said he was "unwilling to
surrender to 33 Members of the Senate, one-third of that body, the
life or death veto over the security of future generations of Ameri-
cans."
31
The Senate ignored the Fulbright Resolution, even though as a
concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 25) it required joint action by
the Senate. Instead, the Senate considered a Senate resolution (S.
Res. 192) that merely needed its own action. This resolution, the
Connally Resolution, included the phrase "through its constitutional
processes" to prevent the President from joining the United Nations
without explicit congressional support. 2  Congressional action
meant the "powers of Congress"--both Houses, not just the Sen-
ate.33 A few Senators thought of congressional action as the treaty
process, thereby excluding the House,34 but the majority of Sena-
tors recognized that international commitments (in this case joining
the United Nations) could be made either by treaty or by a majori-
ty of each House voting on a bill or joint resolution.
The final version of the Connally Resolution, approved eighty-
five to five, provided that the United States, "acting through its
constitutional processes," joined in the establishment of an interna-
tional authority with power to prevent aggression. The final para-
graph states that any treaty made to effect the purposes of the
resolution shall be made only with the concurrence of two-thirds of
the Senate.36 Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio) said that the require-
ment for Senate action was added because of the fear that the
President "has shown some indications of a desire to do by execu-
tive agreement things which certainly in my opinion ought to be
the subject of a treaty."37
Little was said during this lengthy debate about congressional
controls over the use of American troops in a UN action. Senator
Claude Pepper (D-Fla.) opposed any delegation of Congress's war-
declaring power to an international body but believed that it would
31. Id. at 7706.
32. Id. at 9187 (statement of Senator Willis).
33. Id. at 8662 (reading by the legislative clerk).
34. See id. at 9187 (statement of Senator Willis); id. at 9189 (statement of Senator
Brooks); id. at 9205 (statement of Senator Wherry).
35. See 89 CONG. REc. at 9207 (Senator Hayden).
36. See id. at 9222.
37. See id. at 9101. The Supreme Court has recognized that the word "treaty" in a
statute does not necessarily mean an international agreement requiring the advice and
consent of the Senate. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
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be permissible for American troops to be used, without prior con-
gressional approval, as a "police force" to combat aggression in
small wars." This loose notion of a "police action" would be later
exploited by the Truman administration as a legal pretext for en-
gaging in full-scale war against North Korea without congressional
approval. Truman was a member of the Senate when Pepper made
that remark.
The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and
China met at Dumbarton Oaks, in Washington, D.C., to give fur-
ther definition to an international organization. Legal specialists
who monitored these meetings speculated on the procedures for
going to war. Edwin Borchard later surmised: "Constitutionally, the
plan seems to assume that the President, or his delegate, without
consulting Congress, the war-making and declaring authority, can
vote for the use of the American quota of armed forces, if that can
be limited when the 'aggressor' resists."39 Two weeks after the
end of the conference at Dumbarton Oaks, President Roosevelt
delivered an address in which he anticipated that Congress would
grant the President advance approval for responding to military
emergencies. He did not claim inherent executive power. In acting
militarily, the President needed congressional authority through an
enabling statute:
The Council of the United Nations must have the pow-
er to act quickly and decisively to keep the peace by force,
if necessary. A policeman would not be a very effective
policeman if, when he saw a felon break into a house, he
had to go to the town hall and call a town meeting to
issue a warrant before the felon could be arrested.
It is clear that, if the world organization is to have any
reality at all, our representatives must be endowed in ad-
vance by the people themselves, by constitutional means
through their representatives in the Congress, with authority
to act.
4°
After Roosevelt's death, President Truman sent a cable from
Potsdam stating that all agreements involving U.S. troop commit-
ments to the United Nations would first have to be approved by
38. See 89 CONG. REc. at 8742-43.
39. Edwin Borchard, The Dumbarton Oaks Conference 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 97, 101
(1945).
40. 11 DEP'T ST. Bu_.L. 448 (1945).
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both Houses of Congress.4' Borchard also believed that the Con-
stitution required approval by both Houses, not merely the Sen-
ate.
42
A different perspective was offered by six specialists in interna-
tional law, writing to The New York Times. Recognizing the risks
to congressional prerogatives, they backed independent presidential
authority:
It is doubtless true that Congress will feel a certain hesitan-
cy in permitting the President, acting through the Security
Council, to engage even a small policing force in interna-
tional action because it will fear that this might commit the
United States to further military action and thus might
impair the discretion of Congress in respect to engagement
in 'war.' 4
3
Yet they suggested that Presidents in the past had wielded broad
discretion in the use of military force and had frequently acted
without explicit congressional authority. The American constitu-
tional system, they said, relied heavily on sensitive political judg-
ments by the President: "Congress has always been dependent upon
the good faith of the President in calling upon it when the situa-
tion was so serious that a large-scale use of force may be neces-
sary. 4
4
Negotiations over the UN continued at the conference in San
Francisco in 1945, attended by fifty nations and lasting nine weeks.
Unlike Woodrow Wilson's handling of the Versailles Treaty, half
of the eight-member U.S. delegation came from Congress. The
House was represented equally with the Senate: Senators Tom
Connally (D-Tex.) and Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-Mich.) and Repre-
sentatives Sol Bloom (D-N.Y.) and Charles A. Eaton (R-N.J.).45
John Foster Dulles, later to be Secretary of State under President
Eisenhower, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1945
that in the past he had "some doubts as to the wisdom of Senators
participating in the negotiations of treaties." After his experience at
41. See Edwin Borchard, The Charter and the Constitution, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 767,
767-68 (1945).
42. See id. at 770-71.
43. Letter, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1944, at 8E (signers of the letter John W. Davis,
W.W. Grant, Philip C. Jessup, George Rublee, James T. Shotwell, and Quincy Wright).
44. Id.
45. See The Charter of the United Nations, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 79th Cong. 197 (1945) [hereinafter UN Hearings].
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the San Francisco conference, he said, those doubts "were dis-
pelled." He might also have acknowledged the participation of
members of the House.
Procedures were developed to permit the United Nations to
employ military force to deal with threats to peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression. All UN members would make avail-
able to the Security Council, "on its call and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements," armed forces and other assis-
tance for the purpose of maintaining international peace and securi-
ty. The agreements, concluded between the Security Council and
member states, "shall be subject to ratification by the signatory
states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."
Given the variety of governmental systems among the member
states, each nation had to determine for itself the meaning of "con-
stitutional processes." For the United States, would approval have
to be granted by Congress, the President, or the two branches
acting jointly?
From July 9 to July 13, 1945, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee held hearings on the UN Charter. Leo Pasvolsky, a
special assistant to the Secretary of State, was asked whether Con-
gress would have ultimate control over the special agreements to
use armed force. He replied: "That is a domestic question which I
am afraid I cannot answer."'47 Senator Vandenberg volunteered
that, in his opinion, the President would not need "the consent of
Congress to every use of our armed forces."''4
In testimony at the Senate hearings, John Foster Dulles stated
that the procedure for special agreements would need the approval
of the Senate acting through the treaty process. It could not be
done unilaterally by the President. That view, he said, was shared
by the entire U.S. delegation. 9 Senator Connally agreed with that
assessment." Senator Walter F. George (D-Ga.) suggested that
congressional approval could be by statute, involving both Houses,
but Dulles disagreed: "The procedure will be by treaty-agreements
submitted to the Senate for ratification."'" Senator Eugene Millikin
(R-Colo.) tried to distinguish between "policing powers" (to be
46. Id. at 644.
47. Id. at 299.
48. Id. at 645-46.
49. See id. at 645-46.
50. See UN Hearings, supra note 46, at 646.
51. Id. at 652.
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exercised exclusively by the President) and "real war problems"
(reserved for congressional action). 2 Dulles agreed that minor
actions could be left purely to the President: "If we are talking
about a little bit of force necessary to be used as a police demon-
stration, that is the sort of thing that the President of the United
States has done without concurrence by Congress since this Nation
was founded."53
Dulles's belief that special agreements would be acted upon by
the Senate to the exclusion of the House was challenged sharply
during Senate floor debate. Senator Scott Lucas (D-Ill.) argued that
the agreements required action by both Houses and cited constitu-
tional passages giving to the entire Congress the power to raise
and support armies and to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces. 4 Decisions to declare war
and to appropriate funds for the military required action by both
Houses. Several Senators also disagreed with Dulles that only
Senate action was needed to approve a special agreement.5
Senator Vandenberg decided to reach Dulles by phone and ask
him to clarify his position. Dulles explained that when the issue
surfaced during the hearings, he thought the question was between
unilateral action by the President (through executive agreement)
versus the retention of congressional control (which Dulles assumed
was Senate action on treaties). The central point he wanted to
make, he said, was that "the use of force cannot be made by ex-
clusive Presidential authority through an executive agreement." On
that matter he was confident. As to whether Congress should act
by treaty or by statute he was less certain.56
During Senate debate, Harlan Bushfield (R-S.D.) said he object-
ed, "and I still object, to a delegation of power to one man or to
the Security Council, composed of 10 foreigners and 1 American,
to declare war and to take American boys into war." Such a pro-
posal "is in direct violation of the Constitution." Congress could
52. Id. at 654.
53. Id. at 655; see also Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the
President, and the United Nations, 81 GEO. LJ. 597, 607-12 (1993) (analyzing police
actions versus war).
54. See 91 CONG. REC. 8021 (1945).
55. See id. at 8021-24 (Senators McClellan, Hatch, Fuibright, Maybank, Overton, Hill,
Ellender, and George).
56. See id. at 8027-28.
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not delegate such a power "even if we desired to do so."57 Sena-
tor Burton Wheeler (D-Mont.) felt strongly on the same point:
If it is to be contended that if we enter into this treaty we
take the power away from the Congress, and the President
can send troops all over the world to fight battles any-
where, if it is to be said that that is to be the policy of
this country, I say that the American people will never
support any Senator or any Representative who advocates
such a policy; and make no mistake about it. 8
President Truman, aware of this debate on which branch would
control the sending of U.S. forces to the United Nations, wired a
note from Potsdam to Senator Kenneth McKellar on July 27, 1945.
Truman pledged without equivocation: "When any such agreement
or agreements are negotiated it will be my purpose to ask the
Congress for appropriate legislation to approve them." 9 On this
request that "Congress" legislate, Senators understood clearly that
Congress "consists not alone of the Senate but of the two Hous-
es." Backed by this assurance from Truman, the Senate support-
ed the UN Charter by a vote of eighty-nine to two."
With the Charter approved, Congress had to decide the mean-
ing of "constitutional processes." What procedure was necessary,
under the U.S. Constitution, to bring into effect the special agree-
ments needed to contribute American troops to UN military ac-
tions? That decision was left to the UN Participation Act of 1945.
m11. THE UN PARTICIPATION ACT
The UN Charter states that whenever there is a threat to peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the UN Security Council
may decide under Article 41 to recommend "measures not involv-
ing the use of armed force." If such actions are inadequate, Article
42 provides that all UN members shall make available to the Secu-
rity Council-in accordance with special agreements-armed forces
and other assistance. These agreements would spell out the num-
bers and types of forces, their degree* of readiness and general
location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be pro-
57. Id. at 7156.
58. Id. at 7988.
59. 91 CONG. REC. at 8185.
60. Id. (statement of Senator Donnell).
61. See id. at 8190.
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vided. Each nation would ratify these agreements "in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes."
Without the slightest ambiguity, Section 6 of the UN Partici-
pation Act states that the agreements "shall be subject to the ap-
proval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution."62
The agreements between the United States and the Security Council
would not result from unilateral executive action, nor would they
be brought into force only by the Senate acting through the treaty
process. Consummation of the agreements required action by both
Houses of Congress. Section 6 includes two qualifications:
The President shall not be deemed to require the authori-
zation of the Congress to make available to the Security
Council on its call in order to take action under article 42
of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or
agreements the armed forces, facilities, or assistance provid-
ed therein: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be
construed as an authorization to the President by the Con-
gress to make available to the Security Council for such
purpose armed forces, facilities, or assistance in addition to
the forces, facilities, and assistance provided for in such
special agreement or agreements. 63
The first qualification means that once the President receives
the approval of Congress for a special agreement, he does not need
subsequent approval from Congress to provide military assistance
under Article 42. Congressional approval is needed for the special
agreement, not for subsequent implementations of that agreement.
The second qualification clarifies that nothing in the UN Participa-
tion Act is to be construed as congressional approval of other
agreements attempted by the President.
In short, the qualifications did not eliminate or weaken the
need for congressional approval. Presidents could commit armed
forces to the United Nations only after Congress gave its explicit
consent. At every step in the legislative history of the UN Partici-
pation Act, these elementary points are underscored and reinforced.
In his appearance before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson agreed that only
after the President receives the approval of Congress is he "bound
62. United Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 264, 59 Stat. 621, § 6
(1945).
63. Id.
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to furnish that contingent of troops to the Security Council; and the
President is not authorized to furnish any more than you have
approved of in that agreement."' When Congresswoman Edith
Rogers (R-Mass.) remarked that Congress "can easily control the
[Security] Council," Acheson quickly voiced his agreement: "It is
entirely within the wisdom of Congress to approve or disapprove
whatever special agreement the President negotiates."'6 Congress-
man John Kee (D-W. Va.) wondered whether the qualifications in
Section 6 permitted the President to provide military assistance to
the Security Council without consulting or submitting the matter to
Congress. Acheson reassured Kee that nothing in the qualifications
permitted the President to circumvent Congress. No special agree-
ment, Acheson said, could have any "force or effect" until Con-
gress approved it:
This is an important question of Judge Kee, and may I
state his question and my answer so that it will be quite
clear here: The judge asks whether the language beginning
on line 19 of page 5, which says the President shall not be
deemed to require the authorization of Congress to make
available to the Security Council on its call in order to
take action under article 42 of the Charter, means that the
President may provide these forces prior to the time when
any special agreement has been approved by Congress.
The answer to that question is "No," that the President
may not do that, that such special agreements refer to the
special agreement which shall be subject to the approval of
the Congress, so that until the special agreement has been
negotiated and approved by the Congress, it has no force
and effect.'
The same type of understanding appears in other parts of the
legislative history of the UN Participation Act. In reporting the bill,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee looked forward to a
shared, coequal relationship between the President and the Con-
gress:
64. Participation by the United States in United Nations Organization: Hearings Before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 79th Cong. 23 (1945).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 25-26.
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Although the ratification of the Charter resulted in the
vesting in the executive branch of the power and obligation
to fulfill the commitments assumed by the United States
thereunder, the Congress must be taken into close partner-
ship and must be fully advised of all phases of our partici-
pation in this enterprise. The Congress will be asked annu-
ally to appropriate funds to support the United Nations
budget and for the expenses of our representation. It will
be called upon to approve arrangements for the supply of
armed forces to the Security Council and thereafter to
make appropriations for the maintenance of such forces.67
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee further noted that "all
were agreed on the basic proposition that the military agreements
could not be entered into solely by executive action."" Despite
this clear record in the committee report, Senators Connally and
Taft in floor debate agreed that in "certain emergencies" the Presi-
dent and the Security Council might be able to act without first
obtaining authority from Congress.69 These observations are inter-
esting, but they do not change the statutory requirement in Section
6 that special agreements must be approved in advance by "appro-
priate Act of joint resolution." Instead, Connally and Taft suggested
that the President might act militarily through UN channels without
activating the special agreement mechanism. They were reflecting
the issue raised at the San Francisco conference and in congressio-
nal debate whether the President might become involved in "police
actions" without first coming to Congress for authority.
Connally continued to entertain the idea that special agreements
could be acted on by the Senate alone, without involvement by the
House. For example, he agreed with Senator Kenneth Wherry (R-
Neb.) that special agreements could be made by treaty.' A Sena-
tor offered an amendment to authorize the President to negotiate a
special agreement with the Security Council solely with the support
of two-thirds of the Senate." Senator Vandenberg argued strongly
against the amendment:
67. S. REP. No. 79-717, at 5 (1945).
68. Id. at 8.
69. See 91 CONG. REC. 10,965-66 (1945).
70. See id. at 10,974.
71. See id. at 11,296.
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If we go to war, a majority of the House and Senate
puts us into war.... The House has equal responsibility
with the Senate in respect of raising armies and supporting
and sustaining them. The House has primary jurisdiction
over the taxation necessities involved in supporting and
sustaining armies and navies, and in sustaining national
defense.
... [The Senate Foreign Relations Committee] chose
to place the ratification of that contract in the hands of
both Houses of Congress, inasmuch as the total Congress
of the United States must deal with all the consequences
which are involved either if we have a war or if we suc-
ceeded in preventing one.3
Vandenberg prevailed. The great majority of Senators under-
stood that the Constitution vested the war-making power in both
Houses of Congress. The amendment was rejected handily, fifty-
seven to fourteen. 3 As noted in a recent article, without an Arti-
cle 43 agreement "nothing in the Senate debates on the ratification
of the United Nations Charter or the United Nations Participation
Act may be read to authorize the President's war power beyond
those previously understood to be within the Constitution."74
In debate on the UN Participation Act, the House also under-
scored its coequal role in authorizing military activities. The House
Foreign Affairs Committee believed that it "is eminently appropri-
ate that the House as a whole pass upon these agreements under
the constitutional powers of the Congress."' Once the bill left the
committee and was debated on the floor, Congressman Sol Bloom
(D-N.Y.) drew upon his experience at the San Francisco conference
to explain why it was crucial for the House to share with the
Senate the decision to authorize special agreements: "The position
of the Congress is fully protected by the requirement that the mili-
tary agreement to preserve the peace must be passed upon by
Congress before it becomes effective. Also, the obligation of the
United States to make forces available to the Security Council does
72. Id. at 11,301.
73. See id. at 11,303.
74. Charles E. Edgar, United States Use of Armed Force Under the United Na-
tions . . .Who's In Charge?, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 299, 337 (1994).
75. H.R. REP. No. 79-1383, at 7 (1945).
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not become effective until the special agreement has been passed
upon by Congress."'76
Congress amended the UN Participation Act in 1949 to permit
limited initiatives by the President, while retaining legislative con-
trol over significant and large-scale military activities. The amend-
ment allows the President to provide military forces to the United
Nations for "cooperative action." Presidential action under this
provision is subject to stringent conditions: U.S. forces can serve
only as observers and guards, can perform only in a noncombatant
capacity, and cannot exceed 1,000 in number.7 When the Presi-
dent provides these troops he shall assure that they not involve
"the employment of armed forces contemplated chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter."'78 As of January 31, 1996, there were
769 U.S. troops under UN control pursuant to the 1949 amend-
ment: 11 in the Middle East, 15 in Iraq-Kuwait, 30 in Western
Sahara, 290 in Macedonia, 419 in Haiti, and 4 in the Georgia
republic.79
IV. THE NATO TREATY
In addition to citing the UN Charter and Security Council
resolutions as grounds for using American troops in military opera-
tions, Presidents regard mutual security treaties as another source of
authority. The same problem of defining "constitutional processes"
under Article 43 of the UN Charter arises with language in mutual
security treaties. For example, the NATO treaty of 1949 provides
that an armed attack against one or more of the parties in Europe
or North America "shall be considered an attack against them
all."8 The treaty further provides that, in the event of an attack,
the member states may exercise the right of individual or collective
self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter and assist
the country or countries attacked by taking "such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force." Article 11 of
the treaty states that it shall be ratified "and its provisions carried
out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional
76. 91 CONG. REC. 12,267 (1945).
77. 63 Stat. 735-36, § 5 (1949).
78. Id.
79. See Marjorie Ann Browne, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, CRS
[Congressional Research Service] Issue Brief, Order Code IB90103, Feb. 16, 1996, at 6.
80. 63 Stat. 2244, Art. 5 (1949).
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processes."'" The Southeast Asia Treaty ("SEATO") of 1949
avoids the language of "an attack upon one is an attack upon all"
but is similar to NATO in the sense that it states that the treaty
"shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes."82
First, it is well recognized that the concept in mutual security
treaties of an attack on one nation being an attack on all does not
require from any nation an immediate response. Each country
maintains the sovereign right to decide such matters by itself. As
noted in the Rio Treaty of 1947, "no State shall be required to use
armed force without its consent." 3 During debate on the Rio
Treaty, Senator Connally, chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, noted: "It is left to the discretion and wish of each of
the nations to adopt such measures as it may approve in carrying
out the obligation to assist the victim of the attack.
84
This general principle applies as well to NATO. During hear-
ings in 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that it "does not mean that the Unit-
ed States would automatically be at war if one of the other signa-
tory nations were the victim of an armed attack. Under our Consti-
tution, the Congress alone has the power to declare war."8" He
and Senator Connally engaged in this exchange:
THE CHAIRMAN: [I]t is up to each country to determine
for itself, is it not, what action it deems necessary to re-
store the security of the Atlantic Pact area?
Secretary ACHESON: There is no question about that,
Senator. That is true.86
During these hearings, Acheson gave the same response to
Senator Vandenberg, who asked whether there was anything in the
treaty "which will lead automatically to a declaration of war on
our part." Acheson replied: "No, sir." Vandenberg pressed the
issue: "The answer, of course, is unequivocally 'No."' Acheson
gave the desired response: "Unequivocally 'No.""' In 1951, dur-
81. Id. at 2246.
82. 6 U.S.T. 84, Art. IX.2 (1945).
83. 62 Stat. 1703, Art. 20 (1947).
84. 93 CONG. REc. 11,124 (1947).
85. North Atlantic Treaty (part 1): Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 81st Cong. 11 (1949).
86. Id. at 21.
87. Id. at 25.
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ing Senate hearings on NATO, Acheson again acknowledged that
the treaty does not compel any nation "to take steps contrary to its
convictions, and none is obligated to ignore its national inter-
ests.""8
These parts of the legislative history establish that NATO does
not give the President any type of unilateral authority in the event
of an attack. What does the treaty mean when it says that its pro-
visions shall be "carried out by the Parties in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes"? To what extent is Congress
involved in implementing the treaty?
To some extent NATO is tied to understandings of presidential
power under the UN Charter. In reporting the NATO treaty, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee pointed out that the provisions
of the defense pact "are expressly subordinated to the purposes,
principles, and provisions of the United Nations Charter." 9 If the
President lacks unilateral powers under the UN Charter, he lacks it
under NATO and other mutual security treaties. That he lacks
unilateral powers either under the UN Charter or NATO should be
obvious from the fact that both are international treaties entered
into by way of a presidential proposal and Senate advice and con-
sent. The President and the Senate cannot use the treaty procedure
to strip the House of Representatives of its prerogatives over the
use of military force.
In the words of one scholar, the provision in the NATO treaty
that it be carried out according to constitutional processes was
"intended to ensure that the Executive Branch of the Government
should come back to the Congress when decisions were required in
which the Congress has a constitutional responsibility."'  The
NATO treaty "does not transfer to the President the Congressional
power to make war."9'
The legislative histories of other mutual security treaties make
the same point. Senator Walter George said this about SEATO:
"The treaty does not call for automatic action; it calls for consulta-
tion. If any course of action shall be agreed upon or decided upon,
88. Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 82d
Cong. 85 (1951).
89. S. ExEc. REP. No. 81-8, at 8 (1949).
90. Richard H. Heindel et al., The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate
43 AM. J. INT'L; L. 633, 649 (1949).
91. Id. at 650.
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then that course of action must have the approval of Congress,
because the constitutional process is provided for."92 The Johnson
administration, both through President Johnson and the Legal Ad-
viser to the State Department, relied on SEATO as legal justifica-
tion for the Vietnam War, but their arguments had to equate "con-
stitutional processes" with unilateral presidential decisions.93
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 clarifies the effect of
mutual security treaties. Authority to introduce U.S. forces into
hostilities shall not be inferred "from any treaty heretofore or here-
after ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation spe-
cifically authorizing" the introduction of American troops. 94 The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee explained that this provision is
to "ensure that both Houses of Congress must be affirmatively
involved in any decision of the United States to engage in hostili-
ties pursuant to a treaty."95
During debate on the North Atlantic Treaty the Senate consid-
ered, and rejected, an amendment that would have required Con-
gress to give explicit and advance approval before the President
could use armed force. Senator Arthur Watkins offered this reserva-
tion to the treaty:
The United States understands and construes article V
of the treaty as follows:
That the United States assumes no obligation to restore
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area or to
assist any other party or parties in said area, by armed
force, or to employ the military, air, or naval forces of the
United States under article V of any article of the treaty,
for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress,
which under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare
war or authorize the employment of the military, air, or
naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint
resolution so provide.'
92. 101 CONG. REc. 1051 (1955).
93. See LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT 42, 48-50, 356 (1971); see
also The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam, 54 DEP'T ST.
BULL 474, 480-81, 485 (1966).
94. 87 Stat. 558, § 8(a) (1973).
95. S. REP. No. 93-220, at 26 (1973).
96. 95 CONG. REC. 9806, 9898 (1949).
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Eighty-four Senators voted against this reservation, with only
eleven Senators in favor.97 One cannot conclude from this vote
that the President has unilateral authority to use armed force with-
out congressional approval. The vote merely signals that an over-
whelming majority of Senators found the language unacceptable. A
rejected Senate amendment does not change the meaning of the
Constitution or the NATO treaty, nor can it nullify the prerogatives
of the House of Representatives.
In legislative history, a negative vote on a proposal does not
endorse the opposite policy. For example, Senator Watkins offered
another reservation, which gained only eight votes with eighty-
seven Senators opposed:
The United States further understands and construes article
5 to the effect that in any particular case or event of armed
attack on any other party or parties to the treaty, the Con-
gress of the United States is not expressly, impliedly, or
morally obligated or committed to declare war or authorize
the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the
United States against the nation or nations making said
attack, or to assist with its armed forces the nation or
nations attacked, but shall have complete freedom in con-
sidering the circumstances of each case to act or refuse to
act as the Congress in its discretion shall determine. 8
Defeat of this reservation does not mean that the United States
has an express or moral obligation to use military force in the
event of an attack on a member of NATO. Such an interpretation
would completely contradict the legislative history of NATO. Each
nation retains sovereign power to decide for itself when and how
to intervene militarily. Senators voted down this second reservation
because they did not want to advertise too brightly what is, in fact,
the unquestioned understanding of the executive and legislative
branches. They did not want to indicate a weakening or softening
of U.S. resolve. Said Senator Connally: "Any reservation is intend-
ed to water down and dilute the treaty or to destroy it, if that can
be done. That is the purpose of the so-called reservations." Oth-
er Senators were concerned that the second reservation by Senator
Watkins would give some encouragement to military ambitions by
97. See id. at 9916.
98. Id. at 9901; see id. at 9916 (Senate vote).
99. Id. at 9903.
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the Soviet Union: "Moscow will keep the peace only so long as
we are strong enough to stay her covetousness."'0
V. TRUMAN IN KOREA
With treaty and statutory safeguards supposedly in place to
protect congressional prerogatives, President Truman nonetheless
sent U.S. troops to Korea in 1950 without ever seeking or obtain-
ing congressional authority. On June 26, he announced that the UN
Security Council had ordered North Korea to withdraw its invading
forces to positions north of the 38th parallel and that "in accor-
dance with the resolution of the Security Council, the United States
will vigorously support the effort of the Council to terminate this
serious breach of the peace."''
On the following day, Truman announced that North Korea had
failed to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. He
summarized the UN action in this manner: "The Security Council
called upon all members of the United Nations to render every
assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution.
In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea
forces to give the [South] Korean Government troops cover and
support."' 2 He said that all members of the United Nations "will
consider carefully" the consequences of Korea's aggression "in
defiance of the Charter of the United Nations" and that a "return
to the rule of force in international affairs" would have far-reaching
effects. The United States, he said, "will continue to uphold the
rule of law."'0
In announcing his determination to uphold the rule of law in
international affairs, Truman undermined the rule of law at home
by unilaterally invoking force under the banner of the United Na-
tions without seeking congressional authority. This step violated the
statutory language and legislative history of the UN Participation
Act, including Truman's own assurance from Potsdam that he
would first obtain the approval of Congress before sending U.S.
forces to a UN action. How was this possible? He simply ignored
the special agreements that were to be the guarantee of congressio-
nal control.
100. Id. at 9908 (Senator Jenner).
101. PUB. PAPERS 491 (1950).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 492.
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Several legal problems accompanied Truman's action. First, he
did not comply with the intent and language of the UN Participa-
tion Act. It could be argued that Truman was required to enforce
the UN Charter as a treaty, just as he is obliged under the Consti-
tution to carry out any statute, since the term "Laws" includes
treaties as well as statutes." But the Security Council resolution
did not obligate the President, or the United States, to take any
particular action. Furthermore, Truman was not at liberty to carry
out a Security Council resolution if such action would violate the
Constitution. Treaties may not be construed to "extend so far as to
authorize what the Constitution forbids."'0 5
President Truman exploited the UN machinery in part because
of a fluke: the Soviet Union had absented itself from the Security
Council during these two crucial votes. It is difficult to argue that
the President's constitutional powers vary with the presence or
absence of Soviet delegates to the Security Council. As Robert
Bork noted in 1971, "the approval of the United Nations was ob-
tained only because the Soviet Union happened to be boycotting
the Security Council at the time, and the President's Constitutional
powers can hardly be said to ebb and flow with the veto of the
Soviet Union in the Security Council."'"
The Truman administration pretended that it was acting pur-
suant to UN authority. On June 29, 1950, Secretary of State Ache-
son claimed that all U.S. actions taken in Korea "have been under
the aegis of the United Nations."'" Aegis is a fudge word, mean-
ing shield or protection. Acheson used the word to suggest that the
United States was acting under the legal banner of the United
Nations, which was never the case. He said that President Truman
had done his "utmost to uphold the sanctity of the Charter of the
United Nations and the rule of law," and that the administration
was in "conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council of
June 25 and 27, giving air and sea support to the troops of the
Korean government."'' 8
104. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
105. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889); see also Michael J. Glennon & All-
ison R. Hayward, Collective Security and the Constitution: Can the Commander in Chief
Power Be Delegated to the United Nations?, 82 GEO. LJ. 1573, 1597 (1994).
106. Robert H. Bork, Comments on the Articles on the Legality of the United States
Action in Cambodia, 65 AM. J. INI"L L. 79, 81 (1971).
107. 23 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 43 (1950).
108. Id. at 46.
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The fact is that President Truman committed U.S. forces to
Korea before the Council called for military action. General Doug-
las MacArthur was immediately authorized to send supplies of
ammunition to the South Korean defenders. On June 26, Truman
ordered U.S. air and sea forces to give South Koreans cover and
support." After Acheson had summarized the military situation
for some members of Congress at noon on June 27, Truman ex-
claimed: "But Dean, you didn't even mention the U.N.!"" Later
that evening the Security Council passed the second resolution. In
his memoirs, Acheson admitted that "some American action, said
to be in support of the resolution of June 27, was in fact ordered,
and possibly taken, prior to the resolution.' After he left the
presidency, Truman was asked whether he had been willing to use
military force in Korea without UN backing. He replied, with
customary bluntness: "No question about it."' 2
President Truman did not seek the approval of members of
Congress for his military actions in Korea. As Acheson suggested,
Truman might have wished only to "tell them what had been de-
cided.""'  Truman met with congressional leaders at 11:30 A.M.
on June 27, after the administration's policy had been established
and implementing orders issued.' 4 He later met with congressio-
nal leaders to give them briefings on developments in Korea with-
out ever asking for authority."' Some consideration was given to
presenting a joint resolution to Congress to permit legislators to
voice their approval, but the draft resolution never left the adminis-
tration."'
It has been argued that President Truman consulted in good
faith with Congress and was told that he could act without legisla-
tive authority. He reached Senator Connally by phone and asked
whether he would have to ask Congress for a declaration of war if
he decided to send American forces to Korea. Connally offered this
109. PUB. PAPERS 529 (1950).
110. GLENN D. PAIGE, THE KOREAN DECISION 188 (1968).
111. DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION 408 (1969); see also Edwin C. Hoyt,
The United States Reaction to the Korean Attack- A Study of the Principles of the United
Nations Charter as a Factor in American Policy-Making, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 45, 53
(1961).
112. MERLE MILLER, PLAIN SPEAKING: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S TRUMAN
276 (1973).
113. 7 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 182 (1976).
114. See id. at 200-02.
115. See id. at 257.
116. See id. at 282-83 nn. 1-2, 287-91.
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advice: "If a burglar breaks into your house, you can shoot at him
without going down to the police station and getting permission.
You might run into a long debate by Congress, which would tie
your hands completely. You have a right to do it as commander-
in-chief and under the U.N. Charter.""' 7
It is frivolous to argue that the President can satisfy statutory,
treaty, and constitutional obligations by touching base with a Sena-
tor and getting a green light, especially from someone like Conna-
lly, whose positions were repeatedly repudiated by the Senate and
Congress. Independent of these interesting phone conversations, we
have to analyze statutes, treaties, the Constitution, and the structure
of government to determine the legality of presidential actions.
Similarly, it is argued that President Truman acted properly
because Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas, who served on the
Foreign Relations Committee and played an active role during the
1945 debates on the UN Charter and the UN Participation Act, saw
no need for Congress to authorize the intervention in Korea. When
President Truman asked congressional leaders whether he should
present to Congress a joint resolution expressing approval of his
action in Korea:
[Lucas] said that he frankly questioned the desirability of
this. He said that things were now going along well....
He said that the President had very properly done what he
had to without consulting the Congress. He said the resolu-
tion itself was satisfactory and that it could pass. He sug-
gested as an alternative that the President might deliver this
message as a fireside chat with the people of the
country ..... He thought that only Senator Wherry had
voiced the view that Congress should be consulted. Many
members of Congress had suggested to him that the Presi-
dent should keep away from Congress and avoid de-
bate." 8
Again, certainly an interesting comment by the Senate Majority
Leader, but nothing Lucas could say in private or in public could
alter the text and intent of the Constitution, the UN Charter, and
the UN Participation Act. Truman had no authority to alter those
documents and neither did Lucas.
117. Robert F. Turner, Truman, Korea, and the Constitution: Debunking the 'Imperial
President' Myth, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 533, 567 (1996).
118. Id. at 574-75.
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Even if a case could be made that the emergency facing Tru-
man in June 1950 was so fast-moving and perilous that it was
incumbent upon him to act promptly without first seeking and
obtaining legislative authority, nothing prevented him from return-
ing to Congress at the earliest opportunity and asking for a sup-
porting statute or retroactive authority. John Norton Moore has
made this point: "As to the suddenness of Korea, and conflicts like
Korea, I would argue that the President should have the authority
to meet the attack as necessary but should immediately seek con-
gressional authorization.""' 9 In a genuine (not a contrived) emer-
gency, a President may have to act without congressional authority,
trusting that the circumstances are so urgent and compelling that
Congress will endorse his actions and confer a legitimacy that only
Congress, as the people's representatives, can provide.20
President Truman tried to justify his actions in Korea by call-
ing it a "police action" rather than a war. That argument was sus-
pect from the start and deteriorated as casualties mounted. On June
29, 1950, at a news conference, he was asked whether the country
was at war. He responded that "We are not at war."'' Asked
whether it would be more correct to call the conflict "a police
action under the United Nations," he agreed with this softball ques-
tion by saying that "is exactly what it amounts to."'2 On July
13, at another news conference, he again called the Korean War a
"police action."'"
Efforts by Truman and Acheson to characterize the Korean
War as some sort of police action taken pursuant to a Security
Council resolution would never wash. The UN exercised no real
authority over the conduct of the war. Other than token support
from a few nations, it remained an American war-measured by
troops, money, casualties, and deaths-from start to finish. The
Security Council requested that the United States designate the
commander of the forces and authorized the "unified command at
its discretion to use the United Nations flag."'24 Truman designat-
ed General MacArthur to serve as commander of this so-called
119. John N. Moore, The National Executive and the Use of the Armed Forces Abroad,
21 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 28, 32 (1969).
120. See FISHER, supra note 1, 38-39, 187.
121. PUB. PAPERS 504 (1950).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 522.
124. Id. at 520.
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unified command.s Nothing the Security Council passed could
have obligated the United States to do anything other than what it
considered necessary and desirable under its own reading of nation-
al interest.
Although Truman and Acheson continued to avoid the designa-
tion of war for the fighting in Korea, federal courts had no diffi-
culty in calling a spade a spade. A federal court noted in 1953:
"We doubt very much if there is any question in the minds of the
majority of the people of this country that the conflict now raging
in Korea can be anything but war."'26
VI. BUSH IN IRAQ
In response to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's invasion of
Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President George Bush sent several
hundred thousand troops to Saudi Arabia. Initial troop deployments
served a defensive purpose, but as the size of the American force
climbed to 500,000 soldiers, an offensive capability emerged.
Instead of seeking authority from Congress, Bush created a
multinational alliance and encouraged the Security Council to au-
thorize the use of military force. The strategic calculations have
been recorded by James A. Baker, 1I, who served as Secretary of
State in the Bush administration. Baker realized that military initia-
tives by Reagan in Grenada and Bush in Panama reinforced in the
international community the impression that American foreign
policy followed a "cowboy mentality." In response to these con-
cerns, Bush wanted to assemble an international political coalition.
Baker notes: "[F]rom the very beginning, the President recognized
the importance of having the express approval of the international
community if at all possible."'27 There was no comparable need
to obtain the express approval of Congress.
125. See id.
126. Weissman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420, 425 (S.D. Cal. 1953);
see also Gagliormella v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 246 (D. Mass 1954);
Carius v. New York Life Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 388 (D. Ill. 1954); A. Kenneth Pye, The
Legal Status of the Korean Hostilities, 45 GEo. LJ. 45 (1956).
127. JAMES A. BAKER, III, THE POLrICS OF DIPLOMACY 304 (1995).
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On November 20, Bush said he wanted to delay asking Con-
gress for authorization until after the Security Council considered a
proposed resolution supporting the use of force against Iraq.28 On
November 29, the Security Council passed Resolution 678, autho-
rizing all member states to use "all necessary means" to force Iraqi
troops out of Kuwait. All necessary means included military action.
To avoid war, Iraq had to withdraw from Kuwait by January 15,
1991.29 The Security Council resolution granted "the most
sweeping authorization to engage in warfare under U.N. spon-
sorship since the 1950 Korean war."'30 Although the Security
Council "authorized" each nation to act militarily against Iraq, the
resolution did not compel or obligate member nations to partici-
pate. States agree to use force pursuant to their own constitutional
systems and judgments about national interests.' The Security
Council "has never required states to use force; it has simply au-
thorized or recommended that they do so. '32
Following the Security Council vote to use military force
against Iraq, Professor Thomas Franck of the New York University
Law School wrote an article for The New York Times, arguing that
a congressional declaration of war is "inapplicable to U.N. police
actions."'33 He claimed that the UN Charter "does not leave room
for each state, once the Council has acted, to defer compliance
until it has authority from its own legislature." The legislative
histories of the UN Charter and the UN Participation Act do not
support Franck's position. Congress did not forfeit its war power to
the Security Council or to the President. It is also misleading to
call the Security Council resolution on Iraq a "U.N. police action."
It was a military action dominated by the United States, assisted by
a number of allies. 3
128. See Bush Is Said to Want U.N. Assent on Force Before Seeking Hill's, WASH.
POST, Nov. 21, 1990, at A14.
129. See U.N. Vote Authorizes Use of Force Against Iraq, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1990,
at Al.
130. Id.
131. See Matthew D. Berger, Implementing a United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion: The President's Power to Use Force Without the Authorization of Congress, 15
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 83, 88-89 (1991).
132. Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Method-
ology Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 896 (1996).
133. Thomas M. Franck, Declare War? Congress Can't, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at
A27.
134. See John M. Hillebrecht, Letter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1990, at 22.; see also Mi-
chael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 85
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In a subsequent article, Franck explained in greater detail why
there was no need to include Congress in the war against Iraq. He
acknowledged that the purpose of the war-declaring clause "was to
ensure that this fateful decision did not rest with a single per-
son."'35 From that premise Franck reasoned that there was no
necessity for congressional involvement. The Framers' intent was
fully satisfied by the UN action: "The new system vests that re-
sponsibility in the Security Council, a body where the most diver-
gent interests and perspectives of humanity are represented and
where five of fifteen members have a veto power. This Council is
far less likely to be stampeded by combat fever than is Con-
gress."'36 Of course the veto power of the United States in the
Security Council is wielded by the President's representative, not
Congress. Moreover, there is no basis for arguing that whenever
we discover a complex, multi-member body like the UN, the con-
stitutional functions of Congress may be set aside. Nor is the legit-
imacy of an authorizing body to be measured by its capacity for
resisting "combat fever." Under that analysis, the votes of the UN
Security Council in June 1950 could be dismissed as illegitimate
purely because of prompt action.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney testified before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on December 3, 1990, that President
Bush did not require "any additional authorization from the Con-
gress" before attacking Iraq.'37 The reference to "additional autho-
rization" implies that UN action was sufficient. Cheney referred to
the President's authority as Commander in Chief, and then noted:
"[G]iven the authorization, the vote-not authorization but certainly
the vote by the United Nations in support of that effort, that the
President is within his authority at this point to carry out his re-
sponsibilities."' 38 The UN action, he said, made congressional ac-
tion not only unnecessary but counterproductive:
As a general proposition, I can think that the notion of a
declaration of war to some extent flies in the face of what
we are trying to accomplish here. And what we are trying
AM. J. INT'L L. 74 (1991).
135. Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: 'The Old
Order Changeth,' 85 AM. J. INr'L L. 63, 74 (1991).
136. Id.
137. Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implications: Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 101st Cong. 701 (1990).
138. Id. at 702.
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to accomplish is to marshal an international force, some 26,
27 nations having committed forces to the enterprise, work-
ing under the auspices of the United Nations Security
Council.'39
From a legal standpoint, "auspices" is as muddy and as disingenu-
ous as Acheson's "aegis."
Secretary of State Baker, agreeing that President Bush did not
need congressional approval to order troops into combat, counseled
that sending hundreds of thousands of soldiers into battle "with the
possibility of significant casualties, but without legislative imprima-
tur, could well prove to be a Pyrrhic victory." He feared that if
Bush did not obtain congressional approval, "we would be unable
to sustain an attack on Saddam from a practical political standpoint
and might have to settle for a policy of containment.""'
The Justice Department argued in court that President Bush
could order offensive actions against Iraq without seeking advance
authority from Congress.'4' This sweeping interpretation of presi-
dential war power was systematically rejected by the court before
holding that the case was not ripe for judicial interpretation. The
Justice Department maintained that definitions of the war power
were left to the elected branches, not the judiciary. The court de-
clined to adopt that theory:
[If the President] had the sole power to determine that any
particular offensive military operation, no matter how vast,
does not constitute war-making but only an offensive mili-
tary attack, the congressional power to declare war will be
at the mercy of a semantic decision by the Executive. Such
an "interpretation" would evade the plain language of the
Constitution, and it cannot stand.' 42
A similar point has been made by other scholars: "[T]he 'this isn't
war' argument would simply eliminate by definitional fiat the con-
stitutional role of Congress as the voice of the American people,
even in cases like Korea and the Persian Gulf involving combat by
American soldiers on a major scale."'43
139. Id. at 703.
140. BAKER, supra note 126, at 334.
141. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
142. Id. at 1145.
143. Jane E. Stromseth, Treaty Constraints: The United Nations Charter and War Pow-
ers, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CUR-
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On January 8, 1991, President Bush asked Congress to pass
legislation supporting the UN position, particularly Security Council
Resolution 678 authorizing the use of all necessary means. 44 The
next day reporters asked whether he needed a resolution from
Congress. His reply: "I don't think I need it ..... I feel that I
have the authority to fully implement the United Nations resolu-
tions." 45 The legal crisis was avoided on January 12 when Con-
gress authorized President Bush to take offensive actions against
Iraq. In signing the bill, Bush indicated that he could have acted
without congressional authority:
As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my
request for congressional support did not, and my signing
this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-
standing positions of the executive branch on either the
President's constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces
to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the
War Powers Resolution.' 46
Notwithstanding this remark at the signing ceremony, the bill
he signed expressly authorized him to act militarily against Iraq. A
signing statement does not alter the contents of a public law.
After the war was over, Bush offered his views on presidential
power during a speech given at Princeton University. Of his ability
to take the country to war without congressional authority he had
no doubt: "Though I felt after studying the question that I had the
inherent power to commit our forces to battle after the U.N. reso-
lution, I solicited congressional support before committing our
forces to the Gulf war."'47 A more mean-spirited attitude toward
Congress appears in a speech Bush gave in Texas during the 1992
campaign. He said that some people asked why he could not bring
the same kind of purpose and success to domestic policy as he did
to the war in Iraq. His answer: "I didn't have to get permission
from some old goat in the United States Congress to kick Saddam
Hussein out of Kuwait. That's the reason."'"
RENT PERSPECTIVES 93 (Gary M. Stem & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994).
144. 1 PUB. PAPERS 13-14 (1991).
145. Id. at 20.
146. Id. at 40.
147. Id. at 497.
148. 1 PUB. PAPERS 995 (1992-93).
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In one of his last addresses, Bush used a speech at West Point
to explain his theory of presidential war power. Referring to Presi-
dent Washington's warning of the dangers of "entangling allianc-
es," and saying that he was right at that point in history, Bush said
that what was "entangling" in Washington's day "is now essen-
tial."149 Congress had a "constitutional role to play" in these in-
volvements, but apparently more to offer support rather than au-
thority. Presidential leadership "involves working with the Congress
and the American people to provide the essential domestic under-
pinning if U.S. military commitments are to be sustainable.' 50
The word authority appears only in reference to international orga-
nizations. Both in Iraq and in Somalia, U.S. forces were "acting
under the full authority of the United Nations."''
VII. CLINTON IN HAITI
A June 4, 1993, statement by President Clinton announced "a
high priority to return democracy to Haiti and to return its dem-
ocratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to his
office."'5 Toward that end, his administration was committed to
working with international organizations, including the Organization
of American States ("OAS") and the United Nations, "to increase
the pressure on the Haitian military, the de facto regime in Haiti
and their supporters.' 51 3 A month later, the Clinton administration
described the details of the Governors Island accord, promising
Aristide's return to Haiti, again reflecting the work of the OAS and
the UN. 5
4
As part of an effort to restore Aristide to power, Clinton decid-
ed in October to send about six hundred U.S. soldiers to Haiti. The
operation was part of a UN-brokered agreement to force Haiti's
military leaders to resign by October 15.' The operation proved
to be embarrassing to the Clinton administration when a group of
armed civilians prevented a contingent of 193 U.S. troops and 25
Canadians from landing.'56 The retreat in the face of tiny Haiti
149. 2 PUB. PAPERS 2229 (1992-93).
150. Id. at 2230.
151. Id.
152. 1 PUB. PAPERS 810 (1993).
153. Id. at 811.
154. See The Governor's Island Accord: A Victory for Diplomacy and Democracy in
Haiti, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, July 26, 1993, at 525.
155. See Despite Dispute, Troops Head to Haiti, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1993, at Al.
156. See Haitians Block U.S. Troop Arrival, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1993, at Al, A14.
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was widely interpreted as a humiliation to the United States. A
policy shift followed. President Clinton now implied that he might
have to use military force. On October 15 he ticked off the telltale
signs of an impending U.S. intervention: "First, there are about
1,000 American citizens living in Haiti or working there. Second,
there are Americans there who are helping to operate our Embassy.
Third, we have an interest in promoting democracy in this hemi-
sphere."'15
7
By late July 1994, rumors circulated about an imminent Securi-
ty Council resolution authorizing an invasion of Haiti. Dante
Caputo, the United Nations' special envoy to Haiti, wrote a
"confidential" memo to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali describing political calculations within the Clinton White
House. This memo, which found its way into the Congressional
Record, states that Clinton's advisers believed that an invasion of
Haiti would be politically desirable because it would highlight for
the American public "the President's decision making capability
and the firmness of leadership in international political
matters.' ' 8
On July 31, the Security Council adopted a resolution "invit-
ing" all states, particularly in the region of Haiti, to use "all neces-
sary means" to remove the military leadership in that island."9
The idea of using the UN as a source of authority for presidential
military actions prompted debate in the Senate, which passed a
resolution stating the sense of the Senate that the Security Council
resolution "does not constitute authorization for the deployment of
United States Armed Forces in Haiti under the Constitution of the
United States or pursuant to the War Powers Resolution (Public
Law 93-148)." This Senate amendment passed by a vote of one
hundred to zero."
At a news conference on August 3, President Clinton once
again denied that he needed support or authority from Congress to
invade Haiti: "Like my predecessors of both parties, I have not
agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get it.' 6' In a
nationwide televised address on September 15, he told the Ameri-
can public that he was prepared to use military force to invade
157. 2 PUB. PAPERS 1755 (1993).
158. 140 CONG. REc. H6433 (daily ed. July 28, 1994).
159. U.N. Authorizes Invasion of Haiti, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1994, at Al.
160. See 140 CONG. REc. S10,415-33 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1994).
161. 2 PUB. PAPERS 1419 (1994).
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Haiti, referring to the UN resolution of July 31 and his willingness
to lead a multinational force "to carry out the will of the United
Nations."' 62 No mention at all of the will of Congress.
The public and a substantial majority of legislators assailed the
planned invasion. Criticized in the past for currying public favor
and failing to lead, Clinton now seemed to glory in the idea of
acting against the grain. He was determined to proceed with the
invasion: "But regardless [of this opposition], this is what I believe
is the right thing to do. I realize it is unpopular. I know it is un-
popular. I know the timing is unpopular. I know the whole thing is
unpopular. But I believe it is the right thing."'63 Where was the
consideration that it was the legal thing, the authorized thing, the
constitutional thing?
Clinton emphasized the need to keep commitments: "I'd like to
mention just one other thing that is equally important, and that is
the reliability of the United States and the United Nations once we
say we're going to do something."'" 4 Who is the "we"? It was
not Congress or the American public. It was a commitment made
unilaterally by the executive branch acting in concert with the
United Nations.
An invasion of Haiti was not necessary. President Clinton sent
former President Jimmy Carter to negotiate with the military lead-
ers in Haiti. They agreed to step down to permit the return of
Aristide. Initially, nearly 20,000 U.S. troops were dispatched to
occupy Haiti and provide stability. 65 House and Senate debates
were strongly critical of Clinton's insistence that he could act
militarily against Haiti without legislative authority. A resolution
was introduced to provide retroactive authorization for the use of
U.S. armed forces in Haiti, but that proposal failed."6 A remark
by Senator Max Baucus, Democrat of Montana, reflected the atti-
tude of many legislators: "The President did not seek my approval
for occupying Haiti. And he will not get my approval now."'67
Both Houses passed legislation stating that "the President should
162. Id. at 1559.
163. Id. at 1551.
164. Id. at 1549.
165. See Clinton Halts Invasion as Haiti Leaders Agree to Quit; U.S. Forces Land
Today, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1994, at Al.
166. See 140 CoNG. REc. H10,973 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994); see also 140 CONG. REC.
HI121 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994).
167. 140 CONG. REc. S14,343 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994).
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have sought and welcomed Congressional approval before deploy-
ing United States Forces to Haiti."'63
VIII. CLINTON IN BOSNIA
In concert with the United Nations and NATO, the United
States participated in humanitarian airlifts into Sarajevo and helped
enforce a "no-fly zone" (a ban on unauthorized flights over Bos-
nia-Herzegovina). In a number of statements in 1993, President
Clinton indicated that he would have to seek the support and au-
thorization from Congress before ordering air strikes. At a news
conference on May 7 he stated: "If I decide to ask the American
people and the United States Congress to support an approach that
would include the use of air power, I would have a very specific,
clearly defined strategy . ,.169 At that same news conference he
switched the word support to authority: "I assure you today that if
I decide to ask for the authority to use air power from the Con-
gress and from the American people.... "70 In another exchange
with reporters, on September 8, he said he would support U.S.
participation along with other NATO nations in Bosnia, but added:
Of course in the United States, as all of you know, any-
thing we do has to have the support of the Congress. I
would seek the support of the Congress to do that.... if
we can get the Congress to support it, then I think we
should participate.... [Military action in Bosnia] has to
be able to be enforced or, if you will, be guaranteed by a
peacekeeping force from NATO, not the United Nations
but NATO. And of course, for me to do it, the Congress
would have to agree.''
On October 20, he wrote to Senators George Mitchell (D-Me.) and
Bob Dole (R-Kans.) that he "would welcome and encourage con-
gressional authorization of any military involvement in Bosnia."'"
However, also during October, President Clinton repeatedly
objected to legislative efforts to restrict his military options. He
said he opposed any amendment "that affects the way our military
168. United States Policy Towards Haiti, Pub. L. No. 103-423, 108 Stat. 4358, § l(b)
(1994).
169. 1 PUB. PAPERS 594 (1993).
170. See id.
171. 2 PUB. PAPERS 1455 (1993).
172. Id. at 1781.
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people do their business, working with NATO and other military
allies," or any amendment that "unduly restricted the ability of the
President to make foreign policy."'73 He did not think "we should
have an amendment which would tie the President's hands and
make us unable to fulfill our NATO commitments."'74 As with
Haiti and the United Nations, "our" commitments would be decid-
ed by the President, not by Congress. When asked whether he
would veto legislation that contained an amendment requiring him
to ask and get the consent of Congress before using troops in Haiti
and Bosnia, his answer rambled but implied that Congress existed
to provide advice, not authority, and that the crucial decision for
using force had to be left to the President:
All I can tell you is that I think I have a big responsibility
to try to appropriately consult with Members of Congress
in both parties-whenever we are in the process of making
a decision that might lead to the use of force. I believe
that. But I think that, clearly, the Constitution leaves the
President, for good and sufficient reasons, the ultimate
decisionmaking authority.... [T]he President must make
the ultimate decision, and I think it's a mistake to cut
those decisions off in advance. 75
President Clinton continued to be "fundamentally opposed" to
any statutory provisions that "improperly limit my ability to per-
form my constitutional duties as Commander-in-Chief."'76 Amend-
ments regarding "command and control" of U.S. forces "would
insert Congress into the detailed execution of military contingency
planning in an unprecedented manner. The amendment would make
it unreasonably difficult for me or any President to operate militari-
ly with other nations when it is in our interest to do so-and as
we have done effectively for half a century through NATO. ' ' "V
For that half-century, NATO had never used military force.
In 1994, Clinton threatened air strikes against Serbian militias
in Bosnia. There were no further statements about seeking authority
from Congress. Decisions to use air power would be taken in
response to UN Security Council resolutions, operating through
173. Id. at 1763.
174. Id. at 1764.
175. Id. at 1768.
176. 2 PuB. PAPERs 1770 (1993).
177. Id.
12731997]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
NATO's military command. Clinton explained: "the authority under
which air strikes can proceed, NATO acting out of area pursuant to
U.N. authority, requires the common agreement of our NATO
allies.' ' 8 In other words, he would seek the agreement of Eng-
land, France, Italy and other NATO allies, but not Congress.
NATO air strikes began in February 1994 and were followed
by additional strikes in April, August, and November. NATO con-
tinued to conduct limited air strikes during the first half of 1995,
but in July the war took a more serious turn when Bosnian Serb
forces overran the UN-designated "safe area" of Sbrebrenica, forc-
ing nearly 30,000 civilians to flee and trapping 430 Dutch peace-
keepers. At the end of August, NATO carried out the war's biggest
air raid.
179
On September 1, 1995, President Clinton explained to congres-
sional leaders the procedures followed for ordering air strikes in
Bosnia. The North Atlantic Council ("NAC") "approved" a number
of measures and "agreed" that any direct attacks against remaining
safe areas would justify air operations as determined "by the com-
mon judgment of NATO and U.N. military commanders." The
NATO air strikes that began on August 29, 1995, were pursuant
"to the NAC's decision of August 1, 1995....8 Clinton said he
authorized the actions "in conjunction with our NATO allies to
implement the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and
NATO decisions."'' On September 12, he regarded the bombing
attacks as "authorized by the United Nations."'82
The next escalation of U.S. military action was Clinton's deci-
sion to introduce ground forces. At a news conference on October
19, Clinton engaged in this give-and-take with reporters:
Q: Would you go ahead, then, and send the troops, even if
Congress does not approve?
The President: I am not going to lay down any of my
constitutional prerogatives here today. I have said before
and I will say again, I would welcome and I hope I get an
178. 1 PUB. PAPERS 186 (1994).
179. See NATO Bombs Serbs in War's Biggest Air Raid, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1995,
at Al; see also NATO Continues Extensive Bombing Across Bosnia; Serbs Remain Defi-
ant, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 1995, at Al; NATO Jets Hit Serbs Again; Bad Weather Cur-
tails Raids, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1995, at Al.
180. 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1473 (Sept. 1, 1995).
181. Id. at 1474.
182. Id. at 1553.
1274 [Vol. 47:1237
SIDESTEPPING CONGRESS
expression of congressional support. I think it's important
for the United States to be united in doing this. . . . I
believe in the end, the Congress will support this opera-
tion.18
3
Clinton's letter to Senator Robert C. Byrd on October 19 also
invited "an expression of support by Congress." '84 White House
press secretary Michael McCurry said that President Clinton would
not be legally bound by anything Congress did, and "if the presi-
dent ever felt he had to act as commander in chief to protect
American interests he would do it," even without Congress's
approval.' In a letter to Speaker Newt Gingrich on November
13, Clinton continued to avoid any suggestion that he needed
authorization from Congress before sending U.S. ground forces to
Bosnia. He told Gingrich:
I will submit a request for a Congressional expression of
support for U.S. participation in a NATO-led Implementa-
tion Force ["IFOR"] in Bosnia promptly if and when the
parties have initialed an agreement that I consider to be a
genuine agreement and after I have reviewed the final
NATO operational plan.'86
Acting on what he considered sufficient authority under Article
I1 of the Constitution and under NATO, Clinton ordered the de-
ployment of 20,000 American ground troops to Bosnia without
obtaining authority or support from Congress. Other forces in Cro-
atia, Hungary, and surrounding countries would increase the U.S.
troop commitment beyond 30,000. The debate over the Bosnia
commitment was peculiar. Regardless of whether a national interest
ever existed, the mere fact that Clinton decided to intervene creat-
ed, by itself, a national interest. And that is not because he con-
vinced Congress and the public that it was in America's interest to
send troops. Far from it. A national interest somehow emerged
independent of the merit or substance of Clinton's policy or the
likely value or injury to the United States. The prevailing argument
was that any effort to renege on his decision, however misguided
the policy, would undermine the credibility of the United States,
the presidency, and NATO.
183. Id. at 1878.
184. 141 CONG. REC. S15,393 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1995).
185. President to Ask for Bosnia Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1996, at A22.
186. 141 CONG. REc. H13,228 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1995).
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This is a remarkable theory. Whenever Presidents act unilateral-
ly to bind the nation-financially and militarily-subsequent chal-
lenges to their action are ill-advised and unacceptable. Instead of
debating national policy and building a consensus, we bow to a
President's initiative. Through such means we undermine represen-
tative democracy. No doubt the credibility of the presidency and
NATO were at stake in Bosnia, but so is the credibility of Con-
gress, the Constitution, and our system of checks and balances. The
relative success of the deployment in Bosnia does not justify taking
additional steps toward autocracy, or monarchy, in foreign af-
fairs.1 8
7
In his address to the nation on November 27, 1995, explaining
the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Bosnia, Clinton said that
the mission would "help stop the killing of innocent civilians,
especially children, and at the same time, to bring stability to Cen-
tral Europe, a region of the world that is vital to our national
interests. It is the right thing to do."' 8 This parallels Clinton's
justification for invading Haiti: it was the right thing, even if not
the legal thing. On December 6, having approved the NATO oper-
ation plan for sending ground troops to Bosnia, Clinton said he
"will be requesting an expression of support from the Con-
gress."'8 9 The support never came.
On December 21, Clinton expected that the military mission to
Bosnia "can be accomplished in about a year."'" A year later, on
December 17, 1996, Clinton extended the troop deployment for
another eighteen months.'9 ' He approved NATO's operation plan
for the Stabilization Force (SFOR) as the successor to IFOR and
welcomed NATO's decision to approve the plan and the "Activa-
tion Order that will authorize the start of SFOR's mission."'"
The Security Council had "authorized" member states to establish
the follow-on force on December 12, 1996.'"3
187. See Louis Fisher, The Bosnia Commitment: Binding the United States by Unilateral
Executive Action, LEGAL TnIES, Mar. 11, 1996, at 22-23.
188. See 31 WEEKLY COMP. PILs. Doc. 2060 (1995).
189. Id. at 2145.
190. Id. at 2216.
191. See 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2525 (1996).
192. Id. at 2524 (emphasis added).
193. See id.
1276 [Vol. 47:1237
SIDESTEPPING CONGRESS
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The scope of the President's war power, conducted through
multilateral operations, was broadcast with great clarity by the
Clinton administration in a May 1994 policy paper. The basic
theme: the President leads, Congress follows. The section devoted
to the relationship between the executive and legislative branches
calls only for "periodic consultations with bipartisan Congressional
leaders on foreign policy engagements that might involve U.S.
forces, including possible deployments of U.S. military units in UN
peace operations."'94  Another White House policy paper,
ambitiously titled "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement" (February 1995), sets forth the basic principles for
employing military force. While there is mention of seeking "sup-
port" and participation from Congress and having the President
engage in regular consultation with legislators, no thought is given
to obtaining authority from Congress before dispatching armed
forces.'95
As a means of diminishing, or extinguishing, the constitutional
role of Congress in matters of going to war, it would be difficult
to top these position papers. A regular series of meetings and
briefings with key congressional leaders are sufficient gestures to
satisfy the constitutional test, according to the Clinton administra-
tion. Whether through the UN, NATO, or multinational alliances,
international and regional organizations can apparently authorize
presidential military actions. From 1988 to 1994, the annual cost
for UN peacekeeping operations grew from $230 million to $3.6
billion."9
Will Congress, and the American people, accept this subordi-
nate, second-class role for the legislative branch? Shall the crucial
question of taking the country from a state of peace to a state of
war be left to the President and his immediate advisers? A recent
study identifies the proper constitutional principles:
194. The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,
DEP'T ST. PUB. 10,161, May 1994, at 14.
195. See THE WHITE HousE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND
ENLARGEMENT iii, 2, 13, 17 (1995).
196. See James Kitfield, Not-So-United, NAT'L J., Jan. 11, 1997, at 70.
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Congress is the only organ of the United States government
which may commit United States forces to actual or poten-
tial combat. Authorization is given by majority votes from
both houses of Congress; under no circumstance is the
judgment of another body, including the Security Council,
a valid substitute for the judgment of Congress.'97
A more central, and constitutional, role for Congress is envi-
sioned in a congressional report that accompanied supplemental
funds to pay for peacekeeping operations initiated by the Clinton
administration. President Clinton requested $2.5 billion in supple-
mental funds for fiscal 1995 to cover unanticipated costs for peace-
keeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance "in and
around" Somalia, Rwanda, Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, Cuba, and Korea.
Many of those operations, as with Rwanda, Bosnia, and Haiti, had
been taken unilaterally by the executive branch without ever seek-
ing congressional approval. Some of them, as with Haiti and Bos-
nia, were initiated in the face of active congressional opposition. In
supplying the supplemental funds, Congress noted that these mis-
sions "all mark significant departures from previous emergency
deployments of American forces." The conferees on this supple-
mental appropriations bill offered their "strong belief' that military
deployments "in support of peacekeeping or humanitarian objectives
both merit and require advance approval by the Congress."'98
However, in the same year that Congress announced the proper
constitutional principles for funding military operations, debate in
the House of Representatives on another matter communicated a
drastically reduced role for Congress. An amendment to repeal the
War Powers Resolution, retaining only the provisions for consulta-
tion and presidential reports to Congress, failed by the narrow
margin of 201 to 2 17 ."' It appeared that almost half of the
House was willing to let the President initiate military activities,
subject only to consultation and reporting requirements.
The Framers assumed that in a system of separation of powers,
each branch would protect its prerogatives and fight off encroach-
ments. The Framers' design has worked well on many fronts, but
not in the use of military force. Presidents advance ambitious theo-
ries of executive prerogative without triggering a serious check
197. Edgar, supra note 73, at 337.
198. H.R. REP. No. 104-101, at 25 (1995).
199. See 141 CONG. REC. H5655-74 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
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from the Congress or the judiciary. It is not merely a matter of
Congress being weakened. Public control and democratic values,
operating through Congress as the representative branch, are also
degraded. For supporters of democratic systems and deliberative
procedures, our present course should be a source of genuine
alarm.

